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Abstract 
If we present sales items or trade units, cars and apartments, in the units of consumption, 
miles and nights, like it takes place in the sharing&rental economy, we can get the model of the 
optimal consumption-leisure choice, where the efforts on pre-purchase search and after-purchase 
care produce non-monetary costs before the use of a trade unit. The paper argues that the 
productivity of these efforts differs from the efficiency of consumers’ efforts on the workplace. 
The consumer searches diligently the quantity to be purchased, he spends money earned by his 
labor or high-productive industry on the purchase and, following his willingness to take care of 
the purchased item, he takes low-productive diligent efforts in order to finally enjoy it. While the 
purchase price of the trade unit is equal to consumer’s willingness to pay, the total costs of his 
industry and diligence become equal to his willingness to accept or to sell the trade unit, the car 
and the apartment, where his marginal and average costs become equal to the equilibrium price 
of the unit of consumption, a mile or a night, and total costs become equal to the equilibrium 
price of the trade unit. The consumers’ productivity function really gets the S-shape, which 
slows the growth of monetary costs and accelerates the growth of non-monetary costs. 
While the consumers’ diligence derives the utility from the trade item at the equilibrium 
level, it enlarges also the spectrum of solutions for the Coase theorem, because the consumers’ 
diligence copies also with externalities. The trade-off between quantity of consumption units to 
be purchased and non-monetary efforts for its’ efficient use appears. The assets are redistributed 
for its more efficient use, from slight to great diligence, or from low to high willingness to take 
care of the trade unit just in accordance with the Black’s Law Encyclopedia where the great or 
high diligence is defined as the diligence that a very prudent person exercises in handling his or 
her own property like that at issue. 
The model demonstrates that the labor augmenting technical progress decreases the 
marginal monetary costs of consumers’ industry and increases non-monetary costs of 
consumers’ diligence at the equilibrium level that can be explained by the loss in the quality of 
trade units, cars and apartments.  
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The outcome of the service augmenting technical progress is ambiguous. While it raises 
the equilibrium price, the consumption falls. But the fall in consumption reduces consumers’ 
diligence and results in the development of the sharing&rental economy. However, if the 
production and services are gross complements, the consumption growths and Veblen effect is to 
be expected where consumption becomes “bad” with respect to leisure and the consumers’ 
diligence becomes excessive. 
 
Key words: search, diligence, willingness to take care, Coase theorem, externalities, 
technical progress 
JEL classification: D11, D83. 
 
Introduction 
The paper continues to develop the concept of the optimal consumption-leisure choice 
under the pre-purchase search and the after-purchase willingness to take care of an item, 
presented at the 68th AFSE Congress (Malakhov 2019). The model challenges the traditional 
theories of home production (Becker 1965, Gronau 1977) and returns to the theory of attributes 
(Lancaster 1966). While the cleaning of an apartment represents efforts before its following use 
and it appears as an option either to buy a service or to clean the apartment up oneself, the 
cleaning in particular and the care of the item in general works like a pre-purchase search with 
the same option – either to pay high price for the search and delivery or to cut expenses and to 
search oneself. So, we start with the search model but under strict limits of the classical labor-
leisure choice. The need to describe the search model as the derivative from the classical labor-
leisure choice, where the equivalence of the marginal utility of both consumption and leisure 
should be confirmed, explains the choice of the static optics. 
Then we proceed from the search to the care of the purchased item. Although there the 
dynamic optics becomes more urgent, we stay on the static base because we assume that at the 
moment of purchase a consumer takes into account some expected quantity of consumption 
units, mileage and nights, to be purchased and used after the purchase. Other words, the 
consumer esteems the time horizon of his choice and the intensity of consumption of the trade 
units, the car and the apartment. Here, the static optics makes the presentation of the diligence as 
a natural way to copy with externalities more transparent and discovers the classical static cost 
curves, now with regard to consumer’s pre-purchase search and after-purchase care of trade 
units. 
 
Allocation of time for search and the consumption-leisure utility function 
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If we presuppose that the search S displaces the labor L and the leisure H from the time 
horizon until the next purchase like an ice squeezes out whiskey and soda from the glass, we get 
the general rule of the allocation of time and the value of the propensity to search ∂L/∂S<0: 
 
If we multiply the propensity to search ∂L/∂S by the wage rate w, we get the value of the 
marginal loss of monetary labor income during the search w∂L/∂S. According to the famous 
George Stigler’s rule we can equalize it with the marginal benefit of the search Q∂P/∂S, where 
quantity demanded Q is given and the price of purchase depends on search P(S). This behavioral 
explicit rule can be used as the constraint to some utility function U(Q,H), where the quantity to 
be purchased Q becomes the variable value and the value of the marginal benefit per unit of 
purchase ∂P/∂S<0 is given by the place of purchase. Indeed, at the optimum level this implicit 
solution should match the explicit behavioral constraint: 
maxU (Q,H ) subject to w
∂L
∂S
=Q
∂P
∂S
(2.1)
Λ =U (Q,H )+λ(w−∂P / ∂S
Q
∂L / ∂S
) (2.2)
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We can suppose that the consumption-leisure relationship is described by the utility 
function U(Q,H)=Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S=Q(L+S)/THH/T |(L+S)T+H/T=1 and its curve is tangent at the point of 
the optimal choice (Q*;H*) to the budget constraint line (Equations 2.5-2.9 and Figure 1): 
L+ S +H =T ; (1.1)
(−∂L / ∂S)+ (−∂H / ∂S) =1; (1.2)
dH (S) = dS
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T
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H
T
=1 (1.5)
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Fig.1. Implicit consumption-leisure choice under the search 
Now we can simplify step by step the unusual values, do not forget that 
∂P/∂S<0;∂L/∂S<0, in order to confirm their correspondence to the classical labor-leisure choice. 
First, we present the behavioral choice of the fixed quantity demanded Q and the variable price 
of purchase PP(S) (Figure 2):  
 
Fig.2.Explicit choice of the pre-determined quantity to be purchased 
Here we take the Q∂2P/∂S2>0 - shape of the QP(S) curve with regard to the assumption 
of the diminishing marginal efficiency of the search and the w∂2L/∂S2<0 – shape of the wL(S) 
curve can be easily drawn from the Equation 2.1 for the values of the propensity to search under 
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the Archimedes’ “whiskey-soda-use” rule as -1<∂L/∂S<0.1 We see that QP(S) and wL(S) curves 
becomes tangent at the moment of purchase QPP with the Q∂P/∂S slope according to the 
behavioral constraint (2.1). It gives us the price per unit of consumption P0=-T∂P/∂S and the 
price of the trade unit QP0 at the zero search level. This is the price paid by shoppers, consumers 
with zero search costs (Dahl 1989). 
w
∂L
∂S
=Q
∂P
∂S
= −w
L+ S
P
(3.1)
w(L+ S) = −QT∂P / ∂S =QP
0
(3.2)
MRS (H forQ) = −
w
∂P / ∂S
∂
2
L / ∂S∂H = −
w
T∂P / ∂S
=
w
P
0
(3.3)
 
This is the equilibrium price because it equalizes consumer’s marginal costs on purchase 
with his average costs: 
MRS (H forQ) =
Q
L+ S
=
w
P
0
⇒ P
0
=
w(L+ S)
Q
= AC (4.1)
MC =
∂w(L+ S)
∂Q
=
∂QP
0
∂Q
= P
0
(4.2)
P
0
= AC =MC = P
e
(4.3)
 
While under the behavioral constraint Q≠Q(S), both the Q(S) and S(Q) exist under the 
allocation of time in the utility function itself because the ∂Q/∂H relationship presumes the 
existence of ∂L/∂Q and ∂S/∂Q relationships at the implicit utility level.  
Now we can prove the identity of marginal utility of both consumption and leisure under 
the classical labor-leisure choice and the choice on imperfect market under the search with the 
help of the methodology for the analysis of the Lagrangian multiplier, proposed once by 
American mathematicians J.V.Baxley and J.C.Moorhouse (Baxley and Moorhouse 1984, 
Malakhov 2015): 
																																																								
1 The value ∂L/∂S<-1 goes beyond the time horizon and produces «the leisure model» of behavior (∂Q/∂H>0), that 
will be presented by the analysis of the service augmenting technical progress (S.M.). 
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It means that in the static world the search and care don’t change marginal utility of both 
consumption and leisure. But we see that the purchase price is not related directly to the 
marginal utility of consumption. The same happens with the purchase price of leisure, which is 
equal to the value (-w∂L/∂S=w(L+S)/T), that corresponds to the “price” of leisure got by field 
studies in the economics of transportation and the economics of tourism as PH≈1/4-1/2w (Cesario 
1976). 
However, when the time horizon is divided between labor, search, and leisure the search 
represents any activity, which decreases the purchase price. Thus, the marginal benefit of 
search Q∂P/∂S becomes equal to the marginal benefit of home production with regard to the 
corresponding market services (Aguiar and Hurst 2007a). 
The pre-purchase search and the after-purchase care don’t change the marginal utility of 
both consumption and leisure with respect to the classical labor-leisure choice. However, the 
need to take care after the purchase in order to derive utility from the trade items changes 
definitely the optics on the quantity demanded. At the equilibrium level consumers become 
shoppers and they bear neither pre-purchase, nor after-purchase costs they also don’t make 
efforts to derive the utility. Here we need the optics of the sharing&rental economy, where 
consumers buy miles and nights. It means that at the equilibrium level where transaction costs 
equal to zero, the equilibrium price for vehicles is equal to the price of a mile in taxi and the 
equilibrium price for real estate is equal to the price for a night in the hotel. However, this is not 
the unique solution, because the sharing economy, like it takes place in rent-a-car or real estate 
business, offers the options of miles-days and nights-square meters. It is clear that at the 
equilibrium level the utility of miles equals to the utility of days of driving as well as the utility 
of nights in the apartment equals to the utility of it’s square meters. 
Classical labor − leisure choice :
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* / ∂w
T −H
(5.1);
MU
Q
= λP
e
= P
e
∂U
* / ∂w
T −H
(5.2);
MU
H
= λw = w
∂U
* / ∂w
T −H
(5.3);
Choice under the search :
λ = ∂U * / ∂w;
MU
Q
= λ
∂P / ∂S
∂L / ∂S
= −λ
T∂P / ∂S
L+ S
= P
e
∂U
* / ∂w
T −H
(5.4);
MU
H
= −λ
w
∂L / ∂S
∂
2
L / ∂S∂H = λ
wT
T (L+ S)
= λ
w
T −H
= w
∂U
* / ∂w
T −H
(5.5)
	 7	
However, on the level of trade units, where cars and apartments need some efforts to be 
kept in use, buyers become searchers, i.e. consumers with positive search costs (Dahl 1989), and 
the driving like the house maintenance becomes a specific form of home production, where the 
option to produce or to buy the corresponding driving or maintenance market service always 
exists. 
 
Productivity of industry and diligence 
We see that the equilibrium price collects search&care costs of searchers, consumers 
with positive transaction costs, it equalizes the willingness to pay (WTP) of shoppers with the 
willingness to accept (WTA) of searchers. It means that a searcher gets an opportunity to re-sell 
the purchased item to a searcher like any new owner of a car gets a chance to sell miles as illegal 
taxi driver. However, the WTA doesn’t mean that the searcher certainly sells an item. But if he 
does it, the searcher sells his property to the shopper at the equilibrium price of the trade unit 
QPe. While shoppers have different quantity demanded, the equilibrium price dispersion appears, 
like it take place on the market of used cars, where good cars offers greater expected mileage Qg 
with regard to the expected mileage of bad cars Qb. There, good cars are sold at the purchase 
price QgPPg, and bad cars at the purchase price QbPPb. But any mile either in good or in a bad car 
has the same equilibrium price Pe, which is equal to the price of a mile in taxi. This price 
determines the equilibrium prices for trade units, i.e., a good car QgPe and a bad car QbPe. These 
prices appear implicitly like as the cars’ owner decides to become taxi driver and to sell miles to 
shoppers. And the home production of cars’ owner, i.e., the search in the given model, includes 
driving itself and handling – fueling, maintenance, washing and cleaning. 
 
Fig.3. Equilibrium price dispersion 
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However, handling the property also faces the option “to produce or to buy”. Even the 
taxi driver can purchase a corresponding service on the market, or do cleaning and maintenance 
himself.  
At the equilibrium level, the consumer does nothing and becomes a shopper. In taxi he 
leaves driving to the cabman and in the hotel the hostess cleans the room and makes the bed. The 
static search model accumulates all monetary costs as labor costs like it is done by the price of a 
mile in taxi and the price of a night in the hotel, while all non-monetary costs become search 
costs in their general sense, like any physical costs, time and efforts, that decrease monetary 
expenses.  
If we try to compare the productivity of monetary and non-monetary efforts, we come to 
the well-known S-shaped productivity function. We know that on imperfect market the purchase 
price PP depends on quantity demanded, or ∂Pp/∂Q<0.  However, the equilibrium price of a trade 
unit QPe is equal to the willingness to pay of consumers with zero transaction costs and its stays 
constant for any dispersion [Qg>Qb] of purchase prices for a trade unit QPP. And the constant 
equilibrium price highlights the dynamics of labor and search costs. 
Although the purchase price PP falls with the increase in consumption units Q, or 
∂Pp/∂Q<0, the purchase price of a trade unit growths, or ∂QPP/∂Q>0, but it rises slowly, or 
∂
2
QPp/∂Q
2
<0. However, while the purchase price of a trade unit is equal to labor costs, or 
QPP=wL, the constant equilibrium price per consumption unit slows down the growth of labor 
costs (∂wL/∂Q>0; ∂2wL/∂Q2<0 but accelerates the increase in search costs (∂wS/∂Q>0; 
∂
2
wS/∂Q
2
>0). And both the ∂2wL/∂Q2<0 and ∂2wS/∂Q2>0 values results in the corresponding 
inverse productivity relationships. 
All these considerations produce the traditional S-shaped productivity curve Q=Q(L;S) 
(∂Q/∂L>0; ∂
2
Q/∂L
2
>0; ∂Q/∂S>0; ∂
2
Q/∂S
2
<0) and the traditional cubic total costs curve 
(∂wL/∂Q>0; ∂2wL/∂Q2<0; ∂wS/∂Q>0; ∂2wS/∂Q2>0). But before we start to examine total costs 
we should pay particular attention to the productivity itself (Figure 4): 
 
Q
T(L+S)*
AP
MP
TP
L+S
Q*
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Fig.4.The productivity of consumer’s efforts 
We can divide all consumer’s efforts on pre-purchase search, the purchase itself, and 
after-purchase care of the trade unit between high-productive industry (∂2Q/∂L2>0) and low-
productive diligence (∂2Q/∂S2<0). Here we suppose that just the diligence supports the 
willingness to accept or to sell the trade item as it is presented in the common law where the 
great or high diligence means the “diligence that a very prudent person exercises in handling his 
or her own property like that at issue” (Black’s Law Encyplopedia).  The great or high diligence 
results in very thorough treatment of the trade item according to consumer’s willingness to take 
care of it (Malakhov 2019). With regard to the trade item lifecycle it looks like the consumer 
earns industrially money to buy an item, searches it thoroughly, spend labor income on it, and 
handles it carefully after the purchase. Other words the consumer uses his industry to buy an 
item and his diligence to derive correctly the utility from it. 
 
Production possibility frontier with regard to consumer’s diligence 
However, the care as the specific form of the search decreases consumer’s leisure time 
but it can be bought on the market in order to save leisure time. We can suppose that the same 
producer, who sells the item, proposes also its after-purchase maintenance and the costs of this 
maintenance raise the purchase price. By this the producer sells not only some consumption units 
but also he “supplies” leisure time to consumers. But the producer’s resources are limited and he 
always has an option either to produce more consumption units or more services. And it happens 
not only with durables. Even the baker can either leave his son to work in the bakery or to send 
him with warm bread to customers. It means that we can present some sort of his production 
possibility frontier, which demonstrates the trade-off between the production of consumption 
units Q and the creation of consumers’ leisure H. Of course, there is some relevant range. In 
point A his son works in bakery, where he reduces consumer’s leisure because now they should 
go themselves to the bakery, and in point B his son takes a bicycle and delivers warm bread to 
customers.   
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Fig.5.Consumption-leisure production possibility frontier 
We take another example, now of a gardener who also has option either to leave his son 
to work on the plantation or to send him to the customers to trim hedges, to spray fertilizers, and 
to mown lawns. There are shoppers in the community who buy all gardening services at the 
equilibrium price level. However, there are also searchers who make the gardening themselves.  
And their willingness to accept looks reliable because the prudent customer practices usually the 
gardening like his house with the garden at an issue.  
Any point in the relevant range of the production possibility frontier corresponds to some 
price offer with regard to complementary services. At point A the price is net of services, while 
at point B it includes all services. But the equilibrium price for the unit of consumption stays the 
same along the production possibility frontier: 
 
Here the equilibrium price looks like the monopoly price, like Peter Diamond explained 
it, and the producer discriminates customers with respect to their wage rate. While the 
equilibrium price is constant the efficient allocation MRS (H for Q)= w/Pe depends only on the 
wage rate. At point A all low-income consumers are searchers and they mowing their lawns 
themselves. At point B all consumers are shoppers and the son of the gardener mows their lawns 
(figure 6):  
H
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Fig.6.Multiple equilibria under wage rate differential 
If the equilibrium price for a square meter of the lawn or the meter high of trees is 
constant, the community’s optimum will be determined by the wage rate along the production 
possibility frontier.  
But it is not the monopoly price. When the gardener raises the price for the square meter 
of the lawn mowing, the shopper immediately addresses to his neighbor, the searcher, and pays 
to his son the fair price for lawn mowing.  
By this way the searcher starts to play the first chair in the equilibrium price dispersion 
orchestra. The shopper needs the searchers because they protect him from unfair offers. 
However, the producer also needs searchers because he can leave for them some inefficient 
work. It means that a trade-off between quantities of consumption units demanded with and 
without services should exist in some narrow margin because finally it should result in some 
trade-off between the production of consumption units and the “supply” of leisure, or dQ/dH. 
This is the way that enlarges the field for the Coase theorem. 
 
The Coase theorem and consumers’ diligence 
Let’s take a developer who constructs a residence and sells well-isolated apartments. But 
sometime it happens when consumers start to visit the construction when it is not finished yet 
and some apartments are waiting works on isolation. 
The consumer starts to examine the residence, the developer asks the usual question 
about the budget and makes an offer B of well-isolated small apartment with QB square meters. 
The buyer to his turn makes another question about the price per meter without isolation. The 
seller gives an answer and the buyer tells to him that at this price he is ready to buy a greater 
apartment without isolation because he can make it himself under his personal guaranties.2    
																																																								
2 While this practice is forbidden now in France, it still exists in other countries (S.M.) 
H
Q
Q
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If the trade-of of square meters and isolation exists within some narrow range of the PPF, 
the developer accepts this proposal and sells the greater apartment without guarantees on 
isolation.  
From the point of view of the Coase theorem, by this way the seller produces the negative 
externality of both heat and cold, localized by the space of the apartment. But the nature of the 
problem of externality is really reciprocal here. Making the isolation himself, the buyer avoids 
the harm of heat and cold but he inflicts harm on the seller because he cuts his revenues on 
isolation. Then, he makes a step toward the seller and offsets the negative income effect, buying 
more square meters. As a result, the seller moves along some indifference curve along the 
narrow range of his PPF, searching for the new trade-off between consumption and leisure to be 
supplied, and the buyer, although he cuts his leisure time by more labor time L for the purchase 
of the greater apartment and by some working time S on isolation, comes to the upper level of 
his utility function, from U0 to U
*
 (Figure 7): 
Fig.7.The reciprocal optimization under consumer’s diligence 
This logic proves both hypothesis of the Coase theorem (Medema and Zerba 2000, 
Encyclopedia of Law&Economics, p.838). The efficiency hypothesis is confirmed by the fact 
that the asset, here the apartment, is distributed for its more efficient use because if the purchaser 
is not diligent, the developer will keep the apartment for its sale. The invariance hypothesis is 
confirmed here by the fact that the new apartment appears on the market at its equilibrium price 
regardless alternative assignment of property rights because the new owner handles his property 
like that at issue, i.e., when his diligence creates his WTA. 
Here it is very important to follow step by step his decision-making. But before we start 
to analyze the buyer’s decision-making, we should pay attention to the general outcome of the 
model. We see that it simply reproduces the logic of the Edgeworth box. Copying with the 
T H
Q*
B	
E	
Q
w /P
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externality, one part raises its utility level while another part moves along its indifference curve. 
The solution is very simple – to restore the equilibrium price level of the damaged part and to 
keep the equilibrium price level of another part.  
This approach can be applied to the classical case Sturges v. Bridgman, presented by Ronald Coase, where 
the building of a separate wall, which could deaden the noise and vibration, had been examined by the court. The 
confectioner’s machinery had cut the equilibrium price level of the doctor’s practice. However, the mortars also 
produced the negative effect to the confectionery itself. The court had documented the fact that the garden wall had 
been subjected to vibration. Nobody knew whether that vibration would destroy the garden wall or not, but it is 
evident that if confectioner decided once to sell his business, its prudent purchaser would certainly deduct costs of 
constructing a new wall from the market value of the confectionery. It means that the equilibrium price had to take 
into account the costs of construction of the new wall. If there was no risk that the garden wall, if it was destroyed 
by the vibration, damaged also the new consulting room, the confectioner could construct a new wall to deaden the 
noise and vibration or to ask the doctor for the permission to work in night time when there were no patients that 
could be equal to the cost of constructing of a new wall. So, the equilibrium price of the confectionery would stay at 
the same level, i.e., at its market value less the construction costs, moving the confectioner along the indifference 
curve from the construction of a new wall to the working at night. However, if the risk to damage the new 
consulting room existed, it would cut more seriously the equilibrium price of the confectionery. And the cost of the 
restoration of the consulting room could be equal to the replacement of the machinery. Thus, the confectioner would 
go down to the lower indifference curve where he moves from the restoration of the consulting room to the 
replacement of the machinery.  We see that it was better for both parts to bargain before the building of the new 
consulting room, when the option to lease the end of the garden existed, if the confectionery was more efficient than 
the medical practice, because the doctor re-established the market value of his practice in any way but the 
confectioner could stay on his upper indifference curve. 
Now we can come back to the logic of the buyer of the apartment. At point B he spends 
zero personal efforts SB but he is ready to make them thoroughly with all his diligence because 
his low-productive diligence ∂2Q/∂S2<0 results in accelerated growth of costs of his physical 
efforts ∂2wS/∂Q2>0 (Eq.7.1) If the buyer accepts the offer B, his physical MRS (H for 
Q)=QB/(LB+SB) (the dotted tangent line) will be greater than monetary MRS (H for Q)=w/Pe. 
Moreover, this offer doesn’t equalize marginal loss with marginal benefit on purchase and the 
total costs are less than the equilibrium price of the trade unit, here the apartment QBPe (Eq.7.2-
3).  
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Both total costs and the equilibrium price per trade unit are rising with square meters 
(Eq.7.4.). The equilibrium price for the apartment is rising linearly (the equilibrium price per 
square meter Pe is constant), as well as the purchase price for the trade unit QPP(Q)=wL(Q) 
because the seller keeps the same price PP for the square meter without isolation for some 
interval B+q but non-monetary efforts of the buyer continue to rise (Eq.7.5-6). It means that the 
total suboptimal costs are rising faster than the equilibrium price per trade unit and once the 
increase in square meters re-establishes the marginal rate of substitution and the equality of 
marginal loss on self-made isolation with its marginal benefit at the equilibrium price level of the 
upper utility level (Eq.7.7). 
All these considerations reproduce the well-known total cost curve, here the TCL+S curve 
(Figure 8): 
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Fig.8. Total, average, and marginal consumer’s costs 
The buyer pays wL*(Q)=Q*PP for the apartment without isolation and starts to work on it. 
And his diligence changes the shape of the total costs curve. While once in the interval B+q 
labor costs become linear, the diligence rate ∂2wS/∂Q2 certainly becomes equal to the industry 
rate ∂2wL/∂Q2 and marginal costs come to its optimal level ∂MC/∂Q=0. However, the average 
costs’ inertia continues to decline them until the meeting point with marginal costs where they 
come together to the equilibrium price level of the isolated square meter, or MC=AC=Pe. 
While theoretically the externality cannot be eliminated totally, we can take into account 
its residual effect, here in the form of isolation materials, sold by the developer to the buyer. But 
it doesn’t change the logic of the model. Here we see how the static optics reproduces the 
traditional cubic total costs curve. But now it depends not only on the productivity itself. It is 
created by the co-existence of the imperfect market with ∂PP/∂Q<0 of searchers and the perfect 
market of shoppers ∂PP/∂Q=0 with the constant equilibrium price per unit of consumption. In 
some sense, the productivity itself becomes the outcome of the state of the market.  The Figure 8 
gives an intuitive argument that the state of market changes the shape of the total costs curve. 
When the market is close to its perfect state, the shape of labor costs curve becomes close to 
linear and it doesn’t need much diligence from buyers. However, when the market stays 
imperfect, even the increase in productivity, either of consumption units or services cannot 
eliminate consumers’ diligence, other words the home production. This intuitive argument can 
be verified by the analysis of the labor augmenting and service augmenting technical progress.  
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Prices and allocation of time under labor augmenting technical progress 
When workers learn to do their job better, the productivity of labor is augmented over 
some time. This technical progress increases the output of Q and lowers marginal costs of 
production MCQ.  The production possibility frontier becomes steeper and the marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for consumption MRS (H for Q)=w/Pe=MCH/MCQ rises. We can expect 
both equilibrium price and purchase price to fall. And the prices’ dynamics gives an answer to 
the question whether the technical progress reduces the consumers’ diligence or not. 
To understand this, we should determine first of all the dynamics of purchase price. We 
understand that now we cannot take the time horizon as the constant value due to the increase in 
both output and consumption. However, the idea that the time horizon rises proportionally to the 
consumption, or eT,Q=1 doesn’t look reliable. 
It is quite reasonable to assume that the absolute value of marginal savings on purchase 
|∂P/∂S| follows the purchase price, or e|∂P/∂S|, Q=ePp,Q. Tis assumption limits the elasticity of the 
time horizon. To keep the producers’ inflow positive we need eQ|∂P/∂S|,Q=eQPp,Q>0.  
The increase in the MRS (H for Q)=w/Pe= -w/T∂P/∂S =w/T|∂P/∂S| means the fall in the 
equilibrium price and in the value (-T∂P/∂S). If eT,Q=1, we can expect eT|∂P/∂S|,Q= eQ|∂P/∂S|,Q > 0. 
But when ePe,Q<0, we get eT|∂P/∂S|,Q <0. It means that the assumption of the unit consumption 
elasticity of the time horizon eT,Q=1 is wrong. As a result, we get the inelastic time horizon with 
regard to consumption, or eT,Q<1.  
However, this value might be either positive (0<eT,Q<1), or negative (eT,Q<0). If we take 
the positive elasticity of time horizon with regard to consumption, we see that when elasticity of 
both equilibrium price and purchase price with regard to consumption is negative, the fall of 
purchase price is deeper, or ePp,Q < ePe,Q (Equation 8.6). 
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While the difference between the purchase price of a trade unit QPp=wL and the 
equilibrium price of a trade unit QPe=w(L+S) is equal to the value of non-monetary costs wS, the 
conclusion (8.6) become evident. But we can precise this result: 
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We see when purchase price is more sensitive to the technical progress and the following 
growth of both supply and demand than the equilibrium price because the non-monetary costs 
per unit of consumption wS are increasing (eS,Q>1). While we understands that the concept of 
non-monetary costs describes physical efforts that consumers need to derive a utility from the 
trade item, the result (9) means that the labor augmenting technical progress increases 
consumers’ efforts for the recovery of the utility from the trade item. We have no formal grounds 
to talk here about the quality because it is not measurable, but at the commonsense level we 
understand that this conclusion means the fall in the quality of trade items under the labor 
augmenting technical progress. There, workers become more industrious but less diligent. So, 
these are consumers who should become more diligent under the labor augmenting technical 
progress. 
However, we can come to absolutely opposite conclusions, if we subsequently change 
signs in Equations (8-9). Here we can see that the reduction of physical efforts per consumption 
unit results in the cut of the time horizon, or eT,Q<0. It happens when the fall in purchase price is 
less than in the equilibrium price. At the margin consumers can buy for the same price high-
quality items. 
Fig.9.Labor augmenting technical progress 
It looks reasonable for necessities, primarily for food. The reduction in the time horizon 
means the increase in shopping frequency, and it happens with the income growth (Kunst 2019). 
And the fall in prices means the income growth. Sometimes, it happens also with the big-ticket 
items. For example, the age of the car in recession might be greater (Statista 2019). However, the 
H
Q
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increase in shopping frequency for durables adapts well to the phenomenon of the planned 
obsolescence.  
The cut in the time horizon means the reduction of consumers’ diligence and their 
willingness to take care of a big-ticket item because now producers become more diligent. 
However, the development of the customer relationship management (CRM) means the 
accounting of low-productive diligence as labor costs. It results in the growth of quality but 
reduces the productivity. The productivity function becomes almost linear, the purchase price 
becomes less sensitive to changes in quantity supplied and the demand becomes very elastic. 
However, the increase in the services’ productivity can drastically change the situation. 
 
Service augmenting technical progress: from negative productivity to “bad” 
consumption 
The service augmenting technical progress means the increase in the productivity of 
services. By this way producers “supply” more leisure to consumers because services cut home 
production and consumers get more leisure time. However, the increase in the productivity of 
services can result in ambiguous outcomes with respect to the substitution effect of consumption 
units for services. If it is strong, the production of consumption units falls and the equilibrium 
price rises that makes the budget constraint line flatter under the low MRS (H for Q)=w/Pe 
(Figure 10).  Here, the increase of the time horizon is produced by the growth of both labor and 
leisure time because consumers really cut their search and care time due to the value eS,Q>1 
(Equation 9.2).  
Fig.10. The service augmenting technical progress 
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However, the increase in services’ costs rises consumers’ spending. And when total 
consumers’ labor costs wL are rising, the productivity itself falls with respect to consumption 
units, or ∂Q/∂L<0. Here, the phenomenon of the negative productivity appears. 
On the other hand, the increasing service productivity can result in more phenomenal 
outcome. In the substitution effect is small and services and consumption units are gross 
complements, the decrease in the marginal costs of “the production of leisure” is so important 
that it gives a possibility for producers to increase the production of consumption units (Figure 
10).  However, under the constant wage rate it looks like the equilibrium needs the increase in 
the equilibrium price RPT=MCH/MCQ=MRS (H for Q) =w/Pe with the fall of MCH value At a 
glance, this result doesn’t seem paradoxical because it discovers the price growth, now with the 
costs of services. The technical progress gives for producers an opportunity to add more services 
to the price of the consumption unit.  
At the beginning producers also add services to the price of consumption units when they 
sell trade units to shoppers but there the equilibrium price stays constant because there producers 
move along the PPF and discharge shoppers from search&care costs that rise the marginal costs 
of services, i.e., of the “production” of leisure MCH. Other words, they substitute production for 
services. The MCH growth meets the high wage rate and the high willingness to pay of shoppers 
that keeps the equilibrium price of the consumption unit constant. The service augmenting 
technical progress shifts the PPF and cuts the value MCH while the wage rate stays constant. 
Other words, producers add services to any level of consumption. 
We see that the equilibrium price elasticity of consumption becomes positive, or eQ,Pe>0. 
While this result is produced by the increase in leisure time with the fall of its marginal costs 
MCH, the analysis of the budget constraint (2.1) with regard to the leisure time can explain the 
positive eQ,Pe elasticity. 
It is easy to show that the shift from E0 to E1 results in the following equations: 
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Commonly, the value ∂2L/∂S∂H is positive. We have seen that under Archimedes’ 
principle (-1<∂L/∂S<0), the increase in leisure time reduces the absolute value of the propensity 
to search ∂L/∂S=|∂L/∂S|, i.e., it rises its real value (-(L+S)/T). While the value of the propensity 
to search is strictly negative (∂L/∂S<0) and it is followed by the positive ∂2L/∂S∂H value, it is 
expected that the leisure elasticity of equilibrium price for a trade unit, cars and apartments, 
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eQPe,H to becomes negative. Indeed, the value ePe,H is negative because leisure reduces total costs 
(L+S) and the consumption-leisure relationship eQ,H is also negative. However, if we get the 
positive leisure elasticity eQPe,H, like it takes place under the complementary service augmenting 
technical progress, it means that the value ∂2L/∂S∂H changes its sign. It becomes negative. 
But if we come back to the value of the marginal utility of leisure in the consumption-
leisure choice, we can see that under negative ∂2L/∂S∂H value the marginal utility of leisure also 
becomes negative (2.4). The increase in leisure time makes the fall of the propensity to search 
∂L/∂S<0 deeper. It happens when the propensity to search becomes very strong, or ∂L/∂S<-1. 
There, the reduction of labor time under the search and care is so important, that it raises not 
only search and care but also leisure: 
dL(S) = dS
∂L
∂S
;
dL
dS
=
∂L
∂S
< −1 (11.1)
−dL(S) > dS;∂L / ∂H < 0;∂H / ∂S > 0 (11.2)
 
When the marginal utility of leisure become negative, it doesn’t mean that we get here 
the excess leisure. Contrarily, the strong propensity to search creates a deficit of leisure. It seems 
that leisure becomes “negative” within the “negative” time horizon ∂2L/∂S∂H = -1/T (Figure 11, 
Equation 12.2): 
Figure 11. The deficit of leisure and the “bad” consumption 
But we can see that the optimal quantity to be purchased Q* doesn’t depend on the virtual 
negative values of both time horizon and leisure. So, the following set of Equations (12) is true 
in any case and the change in signs of time horizon and leisure doesn’t matter: 
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We see that when the propensity to search becomes strong, or ∂L/∂S< -1, it changes its 
value from ∂L/∂S= -(L+S)/T to ∂L/∂S= -(T+H)/T (Equation 12.1). However, both “negative” 
leisure and time horizon values are virtual because leisure is increasing with the value 
∂
2
L/∂S∂H<0. Now it doesn’t look like the deficit of leisure but like leisure becomes excessive 
under its negative marginal utility. However, this assumption is also invalid. The negative 
marginal utility of leisure radically changes the MRS (H for Q): 
MRS(H forQ) = −
dQ
dH
=
MU
H
MU
Q
;
MU
H
< 0⇒ dQ / dH > 0 (13)
 
Now we understand that the positive leisure elasticity eQPe,H >0 in (10.1) is true because 
the consumption-leisure relationship eQ,H at wconst, ∂P/∂Sconst becomes definitely positive. But it is 
not the end of the story. The value ∂L/∂S<-1 tells us that the leisure-search relationship also 
becomes positive, or ∂H/∂S>0. The Archimedes’ principle stops working. 
It looks strange because the end of the service augmenting technical progress is to cut 
search and care time in favor of leisure. But both search and care are increasing here under the 
pressing of price growth. While the increase in the wage rate makes search and care less 
attractive with regard to the existing price reductions ∂P/∂S, the price growth creates attractive 
high price reductions ∂P/∂S that motivate consumers to search and to care. However, after the 
price growth both search and care take place in upper price niches. For example, the insurance 
moves cars to the upper price niche and motivates buyers to search for cheap options. 
As a result we get the following logical chain: 
∂S / ∂P > 0;∂H / ∂S > 0;∂Q / ∂H > 0⇒∂Q / ∂P > 0 (14)  
When the price growth under the service augmenting technical progress stimulates 
search and care, the Veblen effect ∂Q/∂P>0 is to be expected. 
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This result explains the nature of the price growth under service augmenting technical 
progress, or eQ,Pe>0. But it doesn’t explain all changes produced by the re-allocation of time 
under the deficit of leisure, presented at Figure 11.  
The price growth creates attractive price reductions and makes labor at a given wage rate 
unattractive. It becomes better to search and to care than to work. It looks like the labor 
decreases the utility. The shift of the constraint to the north-east occurs only when leisure 
recovers its positive marginal utility. And it can take place only when the marginal utility of 
labor income MUw= λ becomes negative. But the negative marginal utility of labor income 
makes consumption “bad” (Equation 2.3). The increase in consumption reduces the utility and 
consumers should accept it because they are interesting in leisure. For example, a music lover 
needs to buy or to rent an uncomfortable suit in order to go to opera. It looks like a particular 
price bundling of negative consumption with positive leisure takes place. And sometimes this 
price bundling results in the sunk-costs sensitivity, for example, in skiing, when consumers 
prefer not to rent ski but to buy the equipment and to depreciate it thoroughly by the increase in 
leisure time. 
The last consideration widens the understanding of the consumption model, presented at 
Figure 11. When the purchase of a trade unit can be substituted by the purchase of consumption 
units, like it take place in the sharing economy, the given wage rate keeps the consumption 
model in its “common” frames (-1<∂L/∂S<0) for the given price level and respective marginal 
savings ∂P/∂S.  However, if there is some consumption threshold QH=0, the consumer should 
spend a time horizon to prepare himself to the purchase of a trade unit. Here we don’t know how 
this negative time horizon is allocated between labor and search but we knows definitely that 
there is neither leisure, nor consumption itself. The missed consumption states the fact that the 
chosen trade unit doesn’t represent the necessity. Moreover, the consumption itself becomes a 
quasi-complement to the leisure, which becomes the end of consumption. The willingness to 
accept or to sell also leaves its economic grounds because now it depends on leisure, or 
eQPe,H=eWTA,H>0. This is not only the reason for the positive eQ.Pe elasticity. It is also an answer 
to the question why the equilibrium price rises under the service augmenting technical progress. 
While in the sharing&rental economy it goes up with the fall of production, or eQ,Pe<0, here 
under the services&production complementarity, it rises due to the factor of leisure. Now the 
equilibrium price includes some leisure costs and while we speak about the willingness to sell, 
these costs represent leisure to be abandoned with the sale. Indeed, the consumer leaves “the 
common model” (-1<∂L/∂S<0;∂H/∂S<0) of behavior and comes to “the leisure model” 
(∂L/∂S<-1;∂H/∂S>0).  
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The shift from the common model to the leisure model results in the kinked budget 
constraint where the consumer, trying to recover the deficit of leisure, produces a specific 
catastrophe at the consumption threshold QH=0, where the utility U(Q,H)=Q
-∂L/∂S
H
-
∂H/∂S
=Q
(L+S)/T
H
H/T as well as its marginal value MUw= λ stays undefined due to H=0.
3 As a result, 
the MRS (H for Q) changes its sign in the leisure model. But it doesn’t mean that the equilibrium 
price of consumption becomes negative. The equilibrium price keeps its positive value (Equation 
15): 
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e
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Here we see that the equilibrium price really accounts not only labor and search costs of 
the negative time horizon but also leisure time of the current time horizon. 
And the MRS (H for Q) = MUH>0/MUQ<0=-w/Pe simply states the fact that the real 
wage becomes negative. Indeed, when a trade unit doesn’t represent the necessity, the quantity 
of consumption units demanded looks unnecessary for the current time horizon.  The labor 
income is spent for something that produces the negative utility.  
If we take skiing as an example, we can see that the equilibrium price per unit of 
consumption, here, one downhill race, is formed by ski rentals, which complement this price by 
different price bundling. And the Figure 11 tells us that a person, who rents ski, can enjoy the 
same amount of leisure time in one day or in one season as a person who has bought the 
equipment before.  
Of course, the purchase of the equipment can be depreciated in the next season or by 
more its intensive use in the same season. However, we can see that the change of the time 
horizon doesn’t change the logic of the allocation of time because, as Equations (11.1-11.2) tell 
us, the strong propensity to search ∂L/∂S<-1 results in the positive leisure-choice relationship 
∂H/∂S>0 for any given time horizon.  
The logic of financial management can play here a trick. When we reject taxi and buy a 
car because we need many miles, we follow the financial logic of depreciation. The same 
happens with ski equipment. But there is an important difference between driving and skiing. 
The purchase of the car cut the price with respect to the equilibrium price, i.e., the mile in taxi. 
The purchase of ski also cut the price of one race with respect to the price of the ski rental. In all 
																																																								
3 Zero to the power of zero, denoted by 00, is a mathematical expression with no agreed-upon value. The most 
common possibilities are 1 or leaving the expression undefined, with justifications existing for each, depending on 
context (Wikipedia). 
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cases it means the reduction of labor costs wL with respect to the equilibrium level. However, for 
the car the reduction in labor time is followed by the decrease in leisure time because both labor 
and leisure are squeezed out by the search, here the driving, because we assume that the search 
represents any activity, which reduces purchase price and labor time. In skiing the search takes a 
specific form of ski storage and ski maintenance, the grinding of the ski base and the polishing of 
the ski edges. If we pay for the ski maintenance at the resort, the maintenance fee raises the 
purchase price but it makes the ski maintenance costs irrelevant to the option to rent or to buy. 
So, the storage becomes the key factor for this option. But the ski storage is not driving and it 
doesn’t reduce leisure time. Moreover, the increase in storage time can rise leisure time.4 It 
happens when we buy ski not only for one but also for two-three seasons. From the financial 
point of view it looks very reasonable because the depreciation of the purchase becomes more 
evident. But if we take three-seasons time horizon, we see the reduction of labor time with 
respect to the equilibrium level of ski rental and the increase in both search and leisure time. And 
it means that the long-term efficient planning depreciates the positive purchase price of the 
negative marginal utility of ski. 
If we take for this example the number of downhill races as the quantity demanded, the 
depreciation, as Figure 11 demonstrates, plays its nasty trick even in the first season, when the 
intensity of consumption of the purchased ski is much greater than the intensity of consumption 
of rented ski. 
This illustration gives an idea that the sunk costs’ sensitivity represents an attribute of 
the leisure model of behavior and results in the depreciation of the negative marginal utility of 
consumption. 
The analysis of the depreciation under the leisure model of behavior illustrates the 
commonsense idea that a durable item, for example, a washing machine, cannot stay idle. Once 
it is bought, it should work. If we represent the washing machine as a number of consumption 
units, i.e., clean clothes and household items, we should look for the equilibrium price in the 
price list of the laundry care nearby with free pick-up and delivery. And it doesn’t worth field 
studies to confirm the assumption that the quantity of cleaned items will be greater in the case 
household cleaning.  
This idea returns us to the substitution effect between consumption units and services 
under service augmenting technical progress, when the price growth results in the fall of the 
quantity demanded. The service augmenting technical progress under the common model of 
																																																								
4 The same thing happens with the wine. We can either buy old luxury Bordeaux at the equilibrium level or to cut 
labor costs and to buy young wine in order to keep it. Keeping the wine means the increase in the time of care. The 
wine becomes better and when the bottle is finally open, it is consumed slowly. But it means that the care increases 
the time of enjoyment, i.e., leisure. And we get in total ∂L/∂S<-1 and ∂H/∂S>0.  
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behavior cuts the quantity demanded. As a result, it increases labor time in order to buy 
consumption units with more services but more services “produce” more leisure. Staying within 
the common model, the service augmenting technical progress decreases the time of search and 
care. By this way it reduces the consumers’ diligence and develops the sharing&rental economy. 
But if consumers leave the common model and allocate their time under positive leisure-
search&care relationship ∂H/∂S<0, they stay diligent but their diligence becomes excessive. 
 
Conclusion 
The derivation of the equilibrium price of consumption unit seems not to be useful in the 
applied economic analysis but this is the only way to understand different consumers’ efforts on 
search, purchase, and care. This difference becomes more evident if we take into account the 
wage rate growth, when the allocation of time changes under both income and consumption 
effect (Malakhov 2018). When the consumption effect is small, like it takes place with 
necessities, consumers reduce diligent efforts on search and care in favor of both labor and 
leisure. But if the consumption effect is strong, like it takes place with luxuries, the labor curve 
becomes backward-bending because consumers increase search and care efforts. Here the 
question is whether consumers stay within the “common model” of behavior with the decreasing 
leisure or they come to the “leisure model” with the increasing leisure, where their diligence 
becomes excessive.  
The difference between the common and the leisure model behavior can explain the 
disparity of income growth and measures of happiness (Malakhov 2016). It also explains the 
major distinction between female and male models of the allocation of time discovered by field 
studies when women cuts the non-market work in favor of both market work and leisure, while 
men significantly cut the market work in favor of both non-market work and leisure (Aguiar and 
Hurst 2007b).  
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